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This study investigates the neural mechanisms of mood induced modulation of
cognition, specifically, on reality monitoring abilities. Reality monitoring is the ability
to accurately distinguish the source of self-generated information from externally-
presented contextual information. When participants were in a positive mood, compared
to a neutral mood, they significantly improved their source memory identification abilities,
particularly for self-generated information. However, being in a negative mood had no
effect on reality monitoring abilities. Additionally, when participants were in a positive
mood state, they showed activation in several regions that predisposed them to perform
better at reality monitoring. Specifically, positive mood induced activity within the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) was associated with
improvements in subsequent identification of self-generated information, and positive
mood induced activation within the striatum (putamen) facilitated better identification
of externally-presented information. These findings indicate that regions within mPFC,
PCC and striatum are sensitive to positive mood-cognition enhancing effects that enable
participants to be better prepared for subsequent reality monitoring decision-making.
Keywords: fMRI, medial prefrontal cortex, positive mood induction, reality monitoring, source memory
INTRODUCTION
Being in a positive mood state results in broader attention, broader thought-action repertoires,
greater cognitive flexibility and heightened creativity (Isen et al., 1985, 1987, 1991; Estrada et al.,
1994; Isen, 1999; Fredrickson, 2004; Baumann and Kuhl, 2005). Therefore, delineating the neural
systemmechanisms by which a positive mood influences cognition (e.g., Subramaniam et al., 2009)
is critical for developing innovative treatment approaches for individuals with psychiatric illnesses
characterized by deficits in positive mood and cognition, such as people suffering from depression,
anxiety disorders and schizophrenia.
In this study, we examine the behavioral and neural impact of mood on reality monitoring
abilities. Reality-monitoring is a special type of self-referential source memory. Reality monitoring
is defined as the ability to distinguish the contextual source of internal experiences (self-generated
information) from outside reality (external information; Bentall et al., 1991; Johnson et al., 1993;
Morrison and Haddock, 1997; Vinogradov et al., 1997, 2008; Keefe et al., 1999; Subramaniam
et al., 2012b). Several prior neuroimaging studies have shown that the medial prefrontal
cortex/anterior cingulate cortex (mPFC/ACC) is a key region that supports reality monitoring
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and self-referential processing (Frith and Frith, 1999; Cabeza
et al., 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; Vinogradov et al., 2006,
2008; Gilbert et al., 2007; Subramaniam et al., 2012b). One
strategy that participants may use to identify the source of
externally-presented information is to reject that the information
is self-generated, and must consequently be derived from an
external source. Therefore, identifying the source of external
experiences can be viewed as the other side of the same
coin. In fact, prior studies and ours have shown that the
mPFC supports separate representations of ‘‘self’’ and ‘‘other’’;
but has been shown to be particularly implicated in tagging
information as being relevant to the ‘‘self’’ (Ochsner et al.,
2004, 2005; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Vinogradov et al.,
2006, 2008). For example, Cabeza et al. (2004) also found
that mPFC activation was greater when subjects viewed
photographs of a building that they themselves had taken
(the autobiographical ‘‘self’’ condition) vs. when they viewed
photographs of the same building taken by another person (the
‘‘other’’ condition).
Neural circuitry associated with mPFC/ACC also appears to
be impacted by positive mood. In our previous fMRI study of
insight-based problem-solving (Subramaniam et al., 2009), we
showed that healthy participants who self-rated as higher in
positive mood revealed greater activity within both dorsal and
ventral regions of the mPFC and within the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC) during an anticipatory preparation period prior to
problem onset, when compared to participants who self-rated
lower in a positive mood. Furthermore, increased mPFC
activation prior to problem onset correlated with participants’
overall problem-solving ability and with their positive mood
levels. These data suggest that participants in a positive mood
generated a larger mPFC preparatory signal, which in turn
contributed to better problem-solving performance. However,
we cannot be certain as to whether a positive mood was
the primary mechanism that specifically facilitated subsequent
task performance, or whether some other cognitive/physiologic
characteristic that may have co-varied with positive mood (such
as broader attention/working memory capacity) may have played
such a causal role. Therefore, carefully designed mood induction
(MI) studies in which positive and neutral mood states are both
induced in each participant, are necessary to allow for causal
inferences to be drawn about whether, and where in the brain,
a positive mood can facilitate cognition, relative to a neutral
mood.
Negative mood states have been associated with increased
activity within the subgenual mPFC/ACC and amygdala
(Mayberg et al., 1999; Ochsner et al., 2002). We, therefore,
predicted that when participants were in a negative mood as
compared to a neutral mood, they would activate mPFC and
parahippcampal/amygdala cortices during the autobiographical
recall of negative events. However, less is known about the
neural mechanisms of how a negative mood impacts cognition;
in particular, the interaction between mood induced activity
in mPFC and its role in reality monitoring has never been
investigated to date. However, previous research has shown that
in contrast to certain cognitive-enhancing effects of a positive
mood (in terms of broadening attention, memory and cognitive
control), behaviorally, negative mood states such as anxiety and
depression have been associated with deficits in attentional and
cognitive control mechanisms (Mayberg et al., 1999; Bishop
et al., 2004), often inducing a narrow scope of attention
(Easterbrook, 1959). Reality-monitoring is a multifaceted process
which requires components of attention, memory and cognitive
control; consequently, when participants were in a negative
mood state, we expected to find somewhat opposite effects (or
null effects) of negative mood states on reality-monitoring, as
compared to a positive mood.
In the present study we induced positive, neutral and
negative mood states in each participant in order to investigate
the underlying neural processing during each type of MI
and how neural activity associated with different induced
mood states could modulate subsequent reality monitoring
performance. In general, we expected a positive mood state to
modulate a network of regions, including prefrontal cortices,
parahippocampal cortices and basal ganglia, consistent with
previous research which has shown recruitment of these regions
during positive mood states, and during overall episodic source
memory retrieval (Elward et al., 2015). However, it must be noted
that while many regions are important for episodic memory
retrieval processes in general (including parahippocampal
cortices), here we examine neural activity specifically related
to reality monitoring self-generated recognition processes.
Therefore, we expected that regions activated during source-
memory retrieval processes common to both self-generated
and externally-presented retrieval, will not be observed in our
tightly-constrained self-generated vs. externally-presented recall
contrast; rather we expected regions (such as the mPFC), to
be recruited during specific reality-monitoring self-generated
processes, consistent with Mitchell and Johnson’s (2009) review.
In light of these previous findings, we hypothesized that:
(1) during positive MI as compared to neutral MI, participants
will show better reality monitoring performance; (2) during
positive MI when compared to neutral MI, participants will
show activation in both mPFC and PCC; and (3) the enhanced
mPFC preparatory signal observed during the positive vs. neutral
MI will be associated with better subsequent reality monitoring
self-generated identification.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-five healthy participants (24M, 11F) were recruited via
advertisement. Mean age was 42 years, and mean education
was 16 years. Inclusion criteria were: no Axis I or Axis II
psychiatric disorder (SCID—Nonpatient edition), no substance
dependence or current substance abuse, good general physical
health, age between 18 and 60 years and English as a first
language. This study was carried out in accordance with
the recommendations of the NARSAD Young Investigator
Selection Committee, and the University of California San
Francisco (UCSF) and Northern California Institute for Research
and Education (NCIRE) Committees on Human Research
(CHR). All participants gave written informed consent. We
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conducted two experiments to induce positive, neutral and
negative mood states in each participant in order to test how
different mood states would impact reality monitoring abilities.
We first conducted a behavioral-only MI reality monitoring
task which was completed by 15 participants outside the
scanner (to ensure successful MI), and then we used fMRI
to map brain activation patterns while another 20 participants
completed the MI reality monitoring experiment in the MRI
scanner.
Behavioral Study of the Interactions
Between Mood Induction and Reality
Monitoring
We used validated pictures with positive, neutral and negative
valence from the International Affective Pictures System (IAPS)
to induce positive, neutral and negative mood states (Lang
et al., 1999). Each participant viewed 138 pictures (consisting of
three blocks of 46 positive, 46 neutral and 46 negative pictures),
briefly presented for 4 s, and was asked to imagine being a
part of that particular picture scene. To assess whether the
target mood state was induced, immediately after each picture
each participant rated the intensity of their mood on three
different categories of positive, negative and arousal scales, with
each scale ranging from 0 to 8. For each category, the 0-end
was labeled ‘‘I do not feel at all...’’ and the 8-end was labeled
‘‘I feel extremely. . .’’ Participants then completed the reality
monitoring task. The reality monitoring task consisted of a
word-encoding phase and a reality monitoring identification
phase. In the word-encoding phase, participants were visually
presented with a list of semantically constrained sentences
with the structure ‘‘noun-verb-noun.’’ The final noun was
either presented by the experimenter (e.g., The sailor sailed
the sea), or left blank for subjects to write down and
generate themselves and then recorded by the research assistant
(e.g., The rabbit ate the___). During the reality monitoring
identification phase, subjects were visually presented with
noun pairs from the sentence list (e.g., rabbit-carrot) and
had to indicate whether the second word was previously
self-generated (‘‘I made it up’’) or externally-presented (‘‘You
showed it to me’’; Vinogradov et al., 2008; Subramaniam et al.,
2012b).
fMRI Study of the Interaction Between
Mood Induction and Reality Monitoring
For the fMRI portion of the task, we personalized the MI
technique for each participant via autobiographical recall of
each participant’s subjective past positive, neutral and negative
experiences as this method was found to be a stronger MI
technique. Specifically, we attained higher target positive and
negative mood ratings when the MI was personalized for
each participant (i.e., through autobiographical recall) when
compared with non-personalized pictures from the IAPS (Lang
et al., 1999; see Supplementary Table S1). The MI portion of the
experiment has two components, one consisting of a mood-word
generation phase performed outside the scanner prior to
scanning, and a mood experience-recall phase performed during
scanning. The instructions during the mood-word generation
phase were: ‘‘I would like you to try and generate 30 positive
words, 30 neutral words and 30 negative words that remind you
of your past experiences. The words can be names of people,
places and need not have to make sense to anyone else so
long as it reminds you of your past experience. Neutral words
consist of words that have little or no emotional meaning to
your life. For example, names of objects are usually thought of
as neutral (i.e., wall, paper, table etc). Then, for each word, I’d
like you to remember that the experience associated with that
word, and rate how positive, negative and how aroused you
feel on a scale from 0 to 8 (i.e., 0 = ‘‘I do not feel at all...’’ to
8 = ‘‘I feel extremely. . .’’). The arousal scale can also be thought
of as an excitement/anxiety index that makes your heart rate
activated.’’
During scanning, participants were shown the mood word
(either positive, neutral or negative) for 4 s, and were asked
to imagine the experience associated with each word in order
to induce the target mood state. Using the same task as
the behavioral reality-monitoring experiment, the fMRI reality
monitoring task consisted of a word-encoding phase performed
outside the scanner prior to scanning, and a reality monitoring
identification phase performed during scanning (see Figure 1).
Each fMRI run consisted of 30 trials with 30 mood-words of
the same condition (i.e., 30 positive mood words, for example);
15 self-generated word pairs and 15 externally-presented word
pairs randomly-presented, with each run lasting for 9 min
24 s. Participants completed a total of six runs: two positive
mood conditions, two neutral mood conditions and two negative
mood conditions. Order of the runs were counterbalanced so
that alternating half of the participants began with the positive
mood condition and ended with the negative mood condition,
while the other half of participants began with negative mood
condition and ended with the positive mood condition. The
order sequence of the runs for one participant could thus be:
positive → neutral → negative → positive → neutral →
negative.
Behavioral Statistical Analyses
The principal objective of this article is to investigate the
impact of mood on source memory accuracy. Both our
behavioral and fMRI MI-reality monitoring tasks showed the
same pattern of efficient MI in which both positive and negative
MI were successful at increasing positive and negative mood
states respectively, in relation to the neutral mood condition.
Therefore, to clearly demonstrate overall mood effects on source
memory, we combined the behavioral analyses across the two
tasks in the main article to increase the power in finding
source memory interactions. (See Supplementary Table S1 and
Supplementary Figure S1 for mood effects on source memory
accuracy for each separate task).
Overall accuracy was summated across both correctly-
identified self-generated and externally-presented information
for each mood condition, and then computed as a percentage
of correct responses out of the total number of source-memory
items within that mood condition, averaged across the behavioral
and fMRI tasks. We conducted repeated-measures analysis of
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FIGURE 1 | Task design: Schematic of events within one trial of the experimental paradigm.
variance (ANOVAs): (i) to confirm that the target mood state
was successfully induced; (ii) to examine mood effects on overall
accuracy; and (iii) to examine mood effects on reality monitoring
self-external item identification during the positive and negative
MI, relative to the neutral MI.
Mood Induction Reality Monitoring Task:
fMRI Acquisition
Visual stimuli were presented with E-Prime and back-projected
onto an LCD projector. Participants viewed the screen using
a mirror attached to the head coil and made finger-press
responses on a fiber-optic response pad. fMRI was acquired
on a 3 Tesla Tim Trio Siemens scanner and 12 channel head
coil, using a Echo-planar sequence (TR = 2.4 s, 35 slices,
306 volumes, TE = 30ms, 2mm× 2mm in-plane resolution, slice
thickness = 3 mm, interleaved slice acquisition, FOV = 230 mm;
matrix = 64× 64).
Mood Induction Reality Monitoring Task:
fMRI Statistical Analyses
Image analysis was performed using SPM8 software1.
Images were realigned to correct for motion artifacts using
a six-parameter affine transformation, normalized to a standard
stereotaxic space (Montreal Neurological Institute Template)
using a 12 parameter affine/non-linear transformation, and
spatially smoothed with a 8 mm Full-width half-maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel. The spatial resolution after
normalization was 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm. Data were
1http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/
submitted to a General linear model (GLM) analysis. For
each participant (i.e., first-level analysis), we fit a reference
canonical hemodynamic response function (hrf) to the duration
of each event within the trial (e.g., mood-word presentation,
self-generated word-pair presentation (correct trials) and
externally-presented word-pair presentation (correct trials)).
Thus, altogether, nine event types of interest were modeled:
positive mood word, neutral mood word, negative mood
word, correctly identified self-generated and externally-
presented item-identification in the positive mood condition,
correctly identified self-generated and externally-presented
item-identification in the neutral mood condition, and
correctly identified self-generated and externally-presented
item-identification in the negative mood condition.
Our fMRI task was designed such that variable fixation delays
were used to jitter the events and optimize deconvolution of
the fMRI signal from successive events, and were used as our
implicit baseline (Figure 1). Further, our GLM analysis allowed
us to extract signal to each trial-type, and to factor out signal
due to temporally adjacent events to ensure that signal could be
isolated to the event of interest. For example, when extracting
signal related to MI events, we included in the analysis: the
reality monitoring word-pair presentation and response presses
to factor out signal tied to realitymonitoring processing/outcome
rather than to the MI event. We had a wait time between each
run of about 1 min to allow each participant enough time to
come out of the previous mood state and to start preparing for
the next MI run, in order to allow complete deconvolution of
the BOLD signal to baseline. We used the default high-pass filter
cutoff in SPM8 of 128 s to account for the temporal scanner
drift. Alternating participants received the positive MI first and
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ended with the negative mood condition, while the other half
of participants began with negative mood condition and ended
with the positive mood condition in order to further factor out
any mood-related signal associated with scanner drift or due to
participant fatigue.
Second level analyses were based on a random-effects model
using a significance threshold of p< 0.001, uncorrected. We first
conducted a one-way 3-level repeated measures ANOVA with
MI condition (positive mood, neutral mood, negative mood)
as the within-subject factor to test for main effects of each
mood state using a significance threshold of p < 0.001, with
a FWE cluster corrected extent at p < 0.05. Cluster extent
based thresholding corrections minimize false positives (Type
1 errors) based on the assumption that meaningful activation is
spatially clustered and is, therefore, highly sensitive, accounting
for the fact that individual voxel activations are not independent
of neighboring voxels (Friston et al., 2000; Woo et al., 2014;
arXiv:1606.081992 [stat.AP]). Next, we conducted follow-up
whole-brain ANOVAs in order to examine the discrete specific
neural effects of positive and negative mood states in relation to
the neutral mood state (i.e., positive mood word vs. neutral mood
word, and negative mood word vs. neutral mood word).
To investigate the impact of mood on reality monitoring self
vs. external identification, we conducted conjunction analyses to
find interactions between recruitment of brain regions during
MI and reality monitoring, to confirm whether mPFC and PCC
regions were specifically activated during positive mood states
and during self-generated identification, as consistent with our
predictions. As per standard SPM procedure, we conducted
one sample t-tests in which we first masked the whole-brain
positive mood effect during the MI autobiographical phase
(positive vs. neutral mood state, thresholded at p < 0.001) as
well as the whole-brain self-generated identification effect during
the reality-monitoring identification phase (self-generated vs.
externally-presented identification, thresholded at p < 0.001).
Next, we implemented the equation i1 + 2∗i2 in IMCalc in
SPM8 to find all the regions throughout the brain that showed a
specific positive mood effect and a self-referential effect. By using
the above expression, we were able to find all activated voxels in
image 1 (positive vs. neutral mood state), all activated voxels in
image 2 (self-generated vs. externally-presented identification),
and all voxels which showed activation overlap (i.e., image 3)
between the two contrast masks 1 and 2. In this way, we were
able to find overlapping as well as adjacent non-overlapping areas
within regions that showed both positive mood effects as well as
the reality monitoring self-generated identification effects. Using
the same procedure, we conducted conjunction analyses between
the whole-brain negative mood effect (negative vs. neutral
mood state, thresholded at p < 0.001) with the whole-brain
self-generated identification effect (self-generated vs. externally-
presented identification, thresholded at p< 0.001) to find regions
that showed a specific negative mood self-referential effect.
Finally, we examined brain-behavior correlations within
five ROIs, which included our a priori mPFC and PCC ROIs;
as well as caudate, putamen and parahippocampal regions,
2http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.08199
for which previous studies have shown both positive mood
and source memory effects, as previously mentioned in the
Introduction (Adcock et al., 2006; Mitchell and Johnson, 2009;
Elward et al., 2015). We, therefore, computed mean beta
signal from the functional positive mood activation effect
(i.e., the positive vs. neutral mood contrast, thresholded at
p < 0.001), restricted to each region’s anatomically-defined
boundaries. Pearson’s two-tailed correlations were used to
examine brain-behavior associations by comparing mean beta
signal within the ROIs that showed positive mood sensitive
effects with task performance (self-generated identification and
externally-presented identification). Outliers were defined as
values more/less than 3 SD above/below the mean. Since the
mean beta signal was computed from an independent positive
mood activation contrast (i.e., the positive vs. neutral mood
contrast), and used to interrogate subsequent performance
(self-generated and externally-presented accuracy) based on an
entirely different reality-monitoring task, the brain-behavior
correlations are unbiased and completely independent of each
other.
RESULTS
Efficacy of Mood Induction
Statistical tests confirm the efficacy of our MI protocols.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed that participants rated
their positive mood higher in the positive MI condition when
compared to the neutral MI (F = 157.17, p < 0.0001), and
their negative mood higher in the negative MI when compared
to the neutral MI (F = 257.73, p < 0.0001), confirming that
the target mood state was successfully induced (see Table 1,
Figure 2). Participants did not differ in their ratings of arousal
levels between positive and negative mood states or in ratings
of the targeted MI valence magnitude level (i.e., positive
rating magnitude for positive MI compared to negative rating
magnitude during the negative MI; all p’s> 0.10). Together these
findings demonstrate the effectiveness of our MI protocols.
FIGURE 2 | Mood manipulation check: illustration of successful
positive and negative mood inductions (MI) that enhanced the target
mood state, relative to the neutral MI.
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Effects of Mood Induction on Reality
Monitoring Accuracy
Mood significantly improved overall source-memory
performance. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed
an influence of mood on overall source-memory performance
(i.e., accuracy was summated across both self-generated
and externally-presented information; F = 3.25, p = 0.05).
Follow-up tests showed that this accuracy difference was
driven by participants performing better in the positive mood
condition when compared to the neutral mood condition
(F = 6.55, p = 0.01), but not in the negative vs. neutral mood
condition (F = 0.66, p = 0.42). We also found a main effect
of mood on reality monitoring self-external accuracy for the
positive vs. neutral mood condition (F = 6.55, p = 0.015), but
not for the negative vs. neutral mood condition (F = 0.66,
p = 0.42). Specifically, participants identified significantly
more self-generated information (F = 5.12, p = 0.03) and
marginally more externally-presented information (F = 3.52,
p = 0.07) in the positive mood condition when compared to the
neutral mood condition (see Figure 3). Together, these findings
indicate that a positive mood enhances accurate identification
of self-generated information and also marginally enhances
correct identification for externally-presented information,
contributing to facilitating overall source memory accuracy.
By contrast, we did not find any influence of negative mood
on either self-generated, externally-presented information or
overall accuracy (all p’s> 0.20).
Interaction of Mood Induced Neural
Activity With Neural Activity During Reality
Monitoring
Distinct mood states induce neural activity in a variety of
brain regions, of which positive mood sensitive regions when
compared to a neutral mood, were found in mPFC, PCC
and the basal ganglia, among other regions. Our repeated
FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracy during reality monitoring task performance
for the three types of MI.
measures ANOVA with MI condition (positive mood, neutral
mood, negative mood) as the within-subject factor show all
regions revealing positive mood effects, neutral mood effects,
and negative mood effects, at a voxelwise p < 0.001 threshold,
surviving FWE cluster correction at p < 0.05, illustrated in
Table 2. In order to examine discrete effects of positive mood and
negative mood states when compared to neutral mood states, we
conducted follow-up ANOVAs that reveal all regions showing
greater signal when participants were in positive and negative
mood states (see Table 3, Figure 4). Specifically, whole-brain
positive mood effects when compared to a neutral mood were
found in dorsal and ventral mPFC, PCC, caudate, putamen
and parahippocampal cortex (PHC), with the dorsal and ventral
mPFC and PCC surviving a FWE cluster corrected extent at
p < 0.05 (see Table 3, Figure 4). We also found greater signal
within left superior temporal gyrus/left PHC (L.STG/LPHC), and
basal ganglia (i.e., left caudate and putamen) when participants
were in negative mood states compared to neutral mood states
(i.e., at our voxelwise p < 0.001 threshold, with no clusters
surviving the FWE cluster correction).
Neural activation associated with self-generated vs.
externally-presented item identification has been reported
in several studies of ours and others (Vinogradov et al.,
2006, 2008; Schmitz and Johnson, 2007; Murray et al., 2012;
Subramaniam et al., 2012b). These regions include dorsal
and ventral mPFC and PCC, and we confirm activation of
these regions within the current study. Here, we focus on the
interactions between recruitment of brain regions during MI
and reality monitoring. Therefore, we conducted conjunction
analyses to find regions that showed both positive mood
effects (positive vs. neutral mood state) and self-generated
accuracy effects (self-generated vs. externally-presented item
identification). We found three regions within mPFC, PCC
and striatum that were sensitive to both positive mood
effects (red voxels) and self-generated item identification
effects (yellow voxels; see Figure 5). We did not find any
regions that demonstrated both negative mood effects
(negative vs. neutral mood state) and self-generated item
identification effects (self-generated vs. externally-presented
item identification).
In support of our a priori hypothesis, subsequent ROI
analyses revealed that signals within the mPFC and PCC
during the positive vs. neutral MI correlated with better
subsequent self-generated item identification (see Figure 6).
Interestingly, we also found that signal within the left
putamen correlated with better identification of externally-
presented information. We did not find any outliers for any
correlations. We also did not find any significant correlations
between age with behavior or neural signal in the present
study (all p’s > 0.15). Together, these findings indicate that
distinct neural networks seem to support ‘‘self’’ and ‘‘external’’
judgments during the positive MI; while activation within mPFC
and PCC during the positive MI predicted better accuracy
for self-generated information (but not externally-presented
information), activation within the putamen correlated with
externally-presented item accuracy (but not self-generated item
accuracy).
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TABLE 1 | Mood induction (MI) ratings and reality-monitoring source-memory accuracy.
Positive MI Neutral MI Negative MI
Positive scale ratings (SD) 6.41 (1.15) 2.36 (1.81) 1.01 (1.02)
Negative scale ratings (SD) 0.71 (0.73) 1.31 (1.40) 6.11 (1.23)
Arousal/activation scale ratings (SD) 4.63 (2.05) 1.78 (1.84) 4.94 (1.50)
% Accuracy self-generated (SD) 83.76 (9.55) 80.53 (10.09) 83.05 (12.26)
% Accuracy externally-presented (SD) 86.51 (13.0) 82.80 (13.45) 83.53 (13.59)
% Total accuracy 85.51 (9.82) 81.67 (13.85) 83.29 (11.05)
DISCUSSION
Positive Mood Enhances Reality
Monitoring Accuracy
This is a first-in-kind study in which we demonstrate the neural
plasticity of positive mood states on improving critical cognitive
reality-monitoring functions during identification of previously
self-generated and externally-presented information. Relative to
a neutral mood, when participants were in a positive mood, they
correctly identified significantly more self-generated information
and marginally more externally-presented items. By contrast, the
negative mood condition had no effect on reality monitoring task
performance. Hence, the principal focus of this article is on the
impact of positive mood on reality monitoring.
Neural Mechanisms of Positive
Mood-Cognition Enhancements During
Reality Monitoring
Our conjunction analyses confirmed that mPFC, PCC and
caudate/ventral striatum, showed sensitivity to both positive
MI (red voxels) and identification of self-generated items
(yellow voxels) during the reality monitoring task (Figure 5).
We did not find voxel activation overlap within the three
regions, suggesting that specific areas within mPFC were
particularly sensitive to positive mood effects and other
subdivisions within mPFC were more sensitive to self-generated
effects, yielding adjacent non-overlapping voxels within these
regions. Consistent with our behavioral findings, our fMRI
results did not yield any effect of negative mood states on
TABLE 2 | Whole-brain neural activity induced by each mood state.
Region BA Volume (voxels) Max Z Coordinates
X Y Z
A. Main effect of positive mood (p < 0.001,
with FWE p < 0.05 cluster correction, >111 voxels)
mPFC 10, 9 1347 5.31 −18 50 20
−8 54 10
R. Lingual gyrus 17, 18 470 5.68 8 −90 −2
L. IFG 47, 38, 22 259 4.55 −52 22 −6
R.IFG 47, 13, 22 202 4.37 56 14 −2
Putamen/Insula 13 191 5.05 36 6 10
20 10 18
R. SFG 6 183 4.83 2 8 62
6 6 72
L. Lingual gyrus 17, 18 160 4.10 −4 −98 −8
L. SFG 8 111 4.26 −18 16 46
Main effect of positive mood (p < 0.001, uncorr)
Parahippocampal gyrus 20 75 4.96 33 −5 −23
B. Main effect of neutral mood (p < 0.001,
with FWE p < 0.05 cluster correction, >99 voxels)
R.STG/R.IFG 38, 22, 47 937 5.55 56 14 0
L.MFG 6, 8, 9 582 4.55 −48 18 42
L.IFG/MFG 46, 10 481 4.77 −48 42 6
L.STG 22, 38 290 4.07 −48 12 −4
C. Main effect of negative mood (p < 0.001,
with FWE p < 0.05 cluster correction, >128 voxels)
mPFC 10, 32 860 4.97 −10 52 12
SFG 6 128 4.49 −4 12 70
Main effect of negative mood (p < 0.001, uncorr)
Lingual/Fusiform gyrus 19 79 5.28 30 −76 −20
L. IFG 47, 22 44 4.21 −56 16 −2
Parahippocampal gyrus/Amygdala 28, 35 41 3.98 23 −11 −15
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TABLE 3 | Positive vs. Neutral MIs and Negative vs. Neutral MIs.
Region BA Volume (voxels) Max Z Coordinates
X Y Z
A. Positive vs. Neutral mood induction (p < 0.001,
with FWE p < 0.05 cluster correction, >67 voxels)
Dorsal mPFC 9, 10 246 4.33 −2 56 0
−8 54 14
Lingual gyrus 19, 18 132 4.37 18 −82 −18
Ventral mPFC 10, 32 99 4.18 −6 40 −6
2 38 −4
L.IFG/L.STG 22, 47, 38 90 4.13 −52 16 −8
PCC/Precuneus 31 75 3.72 0 −56 26
Positive vs. Neutral mood induction (p < 0.001, uncorrected)
R. PHC/R.Amygdala 20 63 4.25 38 −8 −20
SFG 6 39 4.14 2 10 64
Caudate 13 28 4.75 20 22 8
L. Putamen 13 27 3.79 −22 −4 12
L. Hippocampus/PHC 35 23 4.08 −28 −14 −14
B. Negative vs. Neutral mood induction (p < 0.001, uncorrected)
L.STG/L.PHC 35 48 5.08 −42 −30 −8
L. Extra-Nuclear/Caudate 47 47 4.03 −14 30 6
reality monitoring. We found a main effect of a negative
mood within mPFC and parahippocampal gyrus/amygdala
(Table 2); however, we did not find any interaction between
negative mood states (when compared to a neutral mood)
and self-generated item identification from our conjunction
analyses.
Brain-Behavior Correlations During the
Positive Mood Induction
When people were in a positive relative to a neutral mood
state, they showed activation in several regions that correlated
with better subsequent reality monitoring item identification.
First, we found that activation within the mPFC and PCC
facilitated better subsequent identification of self-generated
information (Figure 6). This set of findings is consistent with
past research showing that positive mood states and positive
rewarding stimuli enhance preparatory activity within the
mPFC to facilitate subsequent cognitive performance (Knutson
and Cooper, 2005; Subramaniam et al., 2009, 2012a), and
that the mPFC supports reality monitoring task performance
(better identification of self-generated items; Subramaniam
et al., 2012b). In our previous fMRI study of problem-
solving (Subramaniam et al., 2009), the PCC also showed
increased activity during a preparation period preceding
problem-solving, and was a positive mood-sensitive region
that facilitated subsequent problem-solving. Second, we found
that activation within the basal ganglia/striatum (i.e., left
putamen) facilitated better identification of externally-presented
information. The basal ganglia/striatum with its high density
of dopamine receptors is also known to be central to both
the identification and maintenance of memories (McNab and
Klingberg, 2008), and to positive stimuli (Knutson and Cooper,
2005).
In summary, we have strongly demonstrated that positive
mood is reliably associated with preparatory states that increase
signal within mPFC and PCC, and to a lesser extent within
the striatum, and that this modulation leads to better reality
monitoring. We are not arguing that mPFC, PCC and striatal
activation represent neural correlates of positive mood, or
that positive mood states induce reality monitoring. We
conclude that a positive mood is one factor that enhances
activity in mPFC, PCC and striatum, which then mediates
the shift towards better reality monitoring. Reality-monitoring
requires working memory and cognitive control processes,
which are multifaceted processes, involving the recruitment
of frontal regions—including ACC/mPFC as well as bilateral
prefrontal cortices, implicated in controlling attention encoding
of relevant information from environmental stimuli into working
memory processes; and switching attention to select the correct
response (Kondo et al., 2004; Hedden and Gabrieli, 2006). The
specific mechanism by which a positive mood facilitates reality
monitoring abilities is not known. Previous research indicates
that the mPFC/ACC is implicated in self-referential processes
(Cabeza et al., 2004) as well as in general attention and cognitive
control processes, involving controlling and switching attention
to select the correct response (Kondo et al., 2004; Hedden and
Gabrieli, 2006) as well as being modulated during memory and
reward decision-making (O’Doherty, 2011; Euston et al., 2012).
There is also an abundance of evidence indicating that people
in a positive mood state are better able to modulate attention
(Gasper and Clore, 2002; Rowe et al., 2007), working memory
(Ashby et al., 1999, 2002) and cognitive control processes
(Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004). According to Ashby et al.
(1999) neuropsychological model, many of these cognitive-
enhancing effects of a positive mood are due to increased
dopamine release in the PFC and striatum. Further evidence
from physiologic and computational neuroscience research
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FIGURE 4 | Positive mood preparatory effect: whole-brain analyses
revealing regions showing greater signal during positive vs. neutral
mood states.
additionally indicate that dopamine release (e.g., during positive
mood states) can facilitate long-term potentiation, making
memories more robust if it is already available at the synapse
when neurons fire (Otmakhova and Lisman, 1996; Gruber et al.,
FIGURE 5 | Whole-brain conjunction analyses illustrating positive
mood effect (in red) and self-generated identification effect (in yellow)
in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)
and striatum.
2006). These data suggest that regions which are implicated
in mnemonic encoding and retrieval processes—specifically
in source-memory retrieval such as the parahippocampal
cortices, (Mitchell and Johnson, 2009; Elward et al., 2015)
regions which have dopaminergic innervations—such as the
striatum—which are activated during positive mood states may
also help to predispose and facilitate overall memory recognition
processes (Adcock et al., 2006; Mitchell and Johnson, 2009;
Elward et al., 2015). Specifically, dopamine release during
positive mood states is thought to enhance the initiation and
maintenance of mnemonic processes by protecting information
from noise or distraction via enhancement of prefrontal-
striatal/basal ganglia interactions (Gruber et al., 2006; McNab
and Klingberg, 2008). Thus, it is possible that a positive
mood may enhance reality monitoring abilities either by
enhancing attention and long term potentiation of relevant
information from environmental stimuli into working memory
processes; and/or enhancing the switching of attention to
the reality monitoring task to enable selection of the correct
response.
Caveats and Considerations
In our fMRI study, the MI reality monitoring task relies on each
participant’s ability to imagine positive, neutral and negative
past experiences through autobiographical recall. The positive
and negative MI were both successful at increasing positive
and negative mood states respectively, in relation to the neutral
mood condition. While the negative MI did not impede reality
monitoring when compared to a neutral mood, our behavioral
and fMRI findings indicate that a negative mood did not enhance
reality monitoring processes either.
The strength of this paradigm is that despite different MI
stimuli (i.e., each participant recalled his/her own subjective
experiences to elicit positive, neutral and negative mood
states), mPFC and PCC regions were consistently activated,
surviving whole-brain FWE cluster corrections, to reveal positive
mood effects across all participants, relative to the neutral
MI condition. Both positive and negative mood states also
increased participants’ arousal ratings, relative to the neutral
mood condition, and positive and negative mood states did not
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FIGURE 6 | ROI Analyses: Positive mood sensitive regions predict better reality monitoring task performance within (A) mPFC, (B) PCC and (C) basal
ganglia/putamen.
differ in magnitude or arousal levels. Therefore, the positive
mood effects we observed in mPFC and PCC cannot simply be
the result of enhanced valence magnitude or arousal levels; if this
were the case, then we would also expect to observe activation
within these regions during the negative mood condition relative
to the neutral mood condition, which we did not find.
It is well-established that mPFC and PCC are also active
during the default state (Raichle et al., 2001). It does not appear
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that the positive mood associated changes in mPFC and PCC
that we observed in the present study reflect modulation of
the default state network, as this would imply that these same
regions would de-activate during task-directed behaviors, which
was not the case (i.e., mPFC and PCC both revealed increased
activation from baseline during identification of self-referential
information).
Additionally, it must be noted that the location of the dorsal
mPFC that shows positive mood sensitive effects is in a very
different location from subgenual cingulate regions that mediate
depression and anxiety (Mayberg et al., 1999; Ochsner et al.,
2002; Kohn et al., 2014). Prior studies have reported on the
reciprocal nature of subgenual cingulate and dorsal ACC/mPFC
activation; specifically activation within the subgenual cingulate
is increased during depression, while increased activation within
the dorsal mPFC/ACC (the positivemood sensitive region shown
in our study) is found when people remit from depression and
sadness (Mayberg et al., 1999; Ochsner et al., 2002). On this
note, the mid-cingulate cortex, which has shown to be sensitive
to conflict and error detection (Carter et al., 1998; Botvinick
et al., 2004; Kerns et al., 2004), is another region that is in a very
different location from the dorsal mPFC region we report here
which shows sensitivity to positive mood and reality monitoring
self-generated recognition effects.
It is also possible that a positive mood may enhance the
willingness to judge information as ‘‘self-generated’’ as opposed
to ‘‘externally-presented;’’ however in this case, we would
find that a positive mood would then decrease the accurate
identification for externally-presented information as a result
of external judgments being more likely to be misattributed as
‘‘self’’. Rather, our behavioral data indicate that a positive mood
marginally enhances identification of external information, thus
contributing to enhanced overall reality monitoring accuracy.
This raises a final possibility as to whether the reality monitoring
enhancements we observed are the result of a positive mood or
are instead driven by a self-referential memory effect resulting
from general autobiographical recall processes during the MI.
Here again, if this were the case, then we would expect to observe
these enhancements during the negative mood condition, which
we did not find.
Conclusions and Future Directions
In conclusion, we found that when people are in a positive mood,
they show increased activity within the mPFC, PCC and striatum
which precedes and potentiates subsequent reality monitoring
task performance. Activity within mPFC and PCC predicted
better identification of self-generated information while activity
within the putamen predicted better subsequent externally-
presented item identification. By contrast, a negative mood
did not impact reality monitoring abilities. Therefore, future
studies are needed to investigate the specific cognitive processes
involved in prefrontal-cingulate-striatal interactions thatmediate
the shift towards better self-generated processing or towards
better externally-presented item identification when people are
in a positive mood state. These findings may also open new paths
for the development of novel biological-cognitive treatments
for patients suffering from psychiatric illness. Individuals
with schizophrenia, for example, show reality monitoring
impairments associated with mPFC hypoactivation, as well as
a range of cognitive deficits (Fisher et al., 2008; Vinogradov
et al., 2008; Subramaniam et al., 2012b). Intensive computerized
cognitive training has been shown to enhance activity in the
mPFC in a manner associated with better reality monitoring
(Subramaniam et al., 2012b). If positive MI techniques can
also show similar enhancing effects in schizophrenia patients,
it might suggest that behavioral treatments which increase
hedonic capacity and/or harness hedonic mechanisms in the
brain may help to generate improved cognitive performance via
enhancement of signal within mPFC, PCC and the striatum.
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